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Abstract 
 
I test a model of Pareto efficient risk sharing within households using 
consumption data from Ghana.  The results reject this model despite 
showing that individual consumption is not significantly affected by both 
agricultural and illness shocks.  Turning to transfer data, I find evidence 
that men share risks with both family members and non-family friends 
when faced with shocks and that women share risk with non-family 
friends.  The form of these arrangements differ based not only on the 
gender of the individual, but also the type of shock and nature of the 
transfer. 
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The fact that West African marriage bears so little resemblance to
European marriage, in terms both of the domestic economy of the
household, and of day to day social activities, receives insu¢ cient
emphasis in the literature. Spouses usually enjoy little everyday
companionship except, perhaps, when they grow old: they rarely
sit and converse; they eat separately; they tend to have separate
ceremonial and recreational activities. Considering that they are
rarely seen walking down a path together, it is no wonder that
they seldom work jointly to produce crops which either party may
sell, or toil alongside each other on the elds. Hill, 1975, p.124
1 Introduction
When economists and policy makers approach the analysis of mi-
croeconomic behavior of individuals, they often treat the household as a
unitary actor. This paper focuses on responses to risk in a developing
country and examines the question of whether or not we can treat the
household as a unit in its response to risk. Using consumption data from
Ghana, I show that husbands and wives do not insure one another in the
face of agricultural and illness shocks to their income. The consumption
results are conrmed by examining a variety of intrahousehold transfers
in cash and kind. These results indicate that we can reject not only
that the household acts as a unit, but also that it is not an e¢ cient with
respect to risk sharing thereby rejecting a wide class of intrahousehold
allocation models.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that there is little evidence of intra-
household risk sharing, individual private consumption seems to be fairly
well protected against shocks. In an e¤ort to identify the appropriate
risk sharing group, I examine transfers received from individuals from
various sources. The results indicate risk sharing arrangements that
vary depending on the mode of assistance, type of shock and gender of
the individual seeking to smooth their consumption. Men tend to re-
ceive cash and goods transfers from non-family friends in the face of an
agricultural shock and labor assistance from family members when they
experience an illness. I nd no evidence in the mechanisms that I ex-
amine that women receive assistance for agricultural shocks, but women
do receive assistance from non-family friends when they face an illness
shock.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the relevant
literatures exploring mutual insurance and the modeling of household
allocation. Section three describes the model that will be used to test
for insurance and to identify the mechanisms used to smooth consump-
tion. Section four discusses the data that is used in estimation. Section
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ve discusses the estimation strategy and presents results. Section six
concludes.
2 Relevant Literature
Rural people in developing countries face not only the dilemma of poverty
but poverty that is exacerbated by risk. Often starting from an income
level close to subsistence, farmers face unexpected variations in income
that can come from a variety of factors endemic to the environment.
Their income is a¤ected by variations in weather, pests, plant disease,
theft, and other unforeseen events. This environment can also a¤ect
their livelihood more directly though the prevalence of diseases and ill-
ness that are associated with inadequate access to clean water and basic
health care. The ability of these households to cope with these risks is
critical not only to their continued productivity but sometimes to their
very survival.
A large literature in economics has evolved to examine how house-
holds cope with risk. The rst stage in this examination is to examine
how signicantly risk a¤ects consumption. The initial theoretical work
was provided by Diamond (1967) andWilson (1968). Based on this work,
Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), and Townsend (1994) develop a test for
the Pareto e¢ cient allocation of risk. Their test, simply put, is to see
if household consumption varies with idiosyncratic shocks while also co-
moving with average consumption (my model, developed in section II,
will use a similar test and expand it to cover allocation within the house-
hold). Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991), using data from the United
States, nd evidence that many subsets of consumption show evidence
of e¢ cient risk sharing, although Mace (1991) rejects this hypothesis for
certain categories of consumption and preference specications. Using
data from rural India, Townsend (1994) rejects the hypothesis of per-
fect insurance but nds that own income does not have a large e¤ect on
consumption. After correcting for measurement error and other possi-
ble sources of bias, Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) nd similar results
for the same area. Deaton (1992a) also nds an absence of complete
risk pooling in villages in Cote dIvoire. Grimard (1997) studies the
same area as Deaton and uses similar techniques. However Grimard
posits, based on anthropological evidence, that the correct risk pool is
not the village but rather the ethnic group. He nds more risk pool-
ing than Deaton but still does not nd perfect risk pooling. In another
approach to examining diverse patterns of risk pooling, Jalan and Raval-
lion (1999) show that in China the e¤ect of shocks on consumption varies
with wealth and that poorer households show greater variance in con-
sumption. However, no group in their sample shows perfect insurance.
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Another body of literature that examines the question of consumption
smoothing centers around testing the permanent income hypothesis in
both developed and developing countries. Alderman and Paxson (1992)
discuss ways to distinguish between perfect insurance and the permanent
income hypothesis, and Ligon (1998) provides a nested test of these two
regimes as well as a private information regime including moral hazard.
How is this partial risk sharing achieved? A much more extensive
literature examines the individual mechanisms that households use and
I will only discuss selected papers here (Alderman and Paxson (1992)
and Besley (1995) provide more comprehensive reviews). Transfers from
relatives provide a likely candidate, particularly given the importance of
extended family structures in developing countries and in West Africa in
particular. Rosenzweig (1988) provides evidence that rural households
in India use transfers to smooth consumption and that they prefer to
use this mechanism instead of credit. Morduch (1991) also uses data
from India and shows that transfers may reduce risk by forty to ninety
percent. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) show that the formation of in-
surance networks may a¤ect the process of household formation. Using
data from India, they show that spouses are often selected from other
communities in order to provide a non-covariate risk pool.
Credit markets might provide another risk sharing mechanism. Udry
(1994) uses data from Nigeria that shows state contingent repayment
loans are used as an insurance mechanism. While this provides a signi-
cant bu¤er against consumption variation, Udry also rejects the hypoth-
esis of perfect insurance. If we broaden the notion of credit to include
precautionary savings or the use of savings as a self-insurance mecha-
nism, we cross over to the case where behavior may be better charac-
terized by the permanent income hypothesis. Deaton (1992b) uses this
framework to examine savings patterns in Cote dIvoire. He concludes
that savings may be used by farmers to smooth income over time but
this is behavior more likely due to farmers having private information
about their future than indicative of behavior in line with the permanent
income hypothesis. Paxson (1992) shows that farmers in Thailand save
more out of their transitory income in order to secure a smooth con-
sumption path. Beyond credit, households could choose other options
for dealing with risk. Rose (1995) and Kochar (1999) show that labor
supply is used by farmers in India to smooth consumption in the face of
agricultural shocks.
All of these analyses are conducted at the household level. If we be-
lieve that households act as a single unit (as in Becker (1993)), then it
does not matter whether we analyze consumption and risk at the individ-
ual or the household level. However, a growing literature in economics
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questions and tests this assumption in both the less and more developed
countries. Most of the alternatives that have developed to the unitary
approach fall under the general rubric of collective household models.
Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) o¤er a succinct explanation: the
various contributions that follow the collective line share a fundamental
option, namely that a household should be described as a group of in-
dividuals, each of whom is characterized by particular preferences, and
among whom a collective decision process takes place. This class of
models contains a wide range of possible decision process within the
household, and makes only the assumption that the allocation process
is Pareto e¢ cient (Browning, et. al. (1994), Browning and Chiappori
(1994), Chiappori, (1992), and Chiappori (1988)). Note that the broad
class of collective models includes the unitary model as a particular case.
While this general framework does not assume a particular form of pref-
erences nor any prior hypotheses on the sharing rule, the theory does
yield a testable result, i.e. that the Slutsky matrix need not be symmet-
ric (as it would be for individuals).
A more restrictive class of collective models is comprised of those
that represent intrahousehold allocation as the outcome of a coopera-
tive bargaining process (Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Hor-
ney (1981), and McElroy (1990)). This approach begins to provide a
more concrete framework for the analysis of power as McElroy (1990)
notes: "a key issue that separates bargaining from neoclassical models
is the treatment of income: in neoclassical models only pooled family
income matters; in the bargaining approach who has control over the
various income sources matters." In this approach, individuals form a
household when their utility from doing so is greater than their utility
in isolation. To determine the distribution of the gains from union, in-
dividuals engage in a process of Nash bargaining. The opportunity cost
of family membership, or threat point, determines the relative strength
of a household member in the bargaining process. These threat points
are determined by the extra environmental parameters (EEPs) which
determine the utility attainable outside of marriage.
An alterative approach is provided by non-cooperative game the-
ory. The non-cooperative approach is similar to the collective approach
in that it also does not presuppose income pooling (Carter and Katz
(1997), Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1994, 1995)). It treats individuals
as "autonomous subeconomies" who exchange transfers and also have
a vector of commonly consumed goods. Individualsactions are condi-
tioned on the actions of the other household member and thus a Nash
equilibrium is used as the solution concept. These models do not neces-
sarily imply a Pareto optimal outcome (although it can be one possible
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equilibrium). Lundberg and Pollak (1993) use this literature to make an
adjustment to the bargaining models. They note that the use of divorce
as a threat point is an extreme and unrealistic argument. Instead they
propose that the failure of a cooperative outcome will lead to one of a
variety of non-cooperative equilibria.
The major way to empirically distinguish the unitary from other col-
lective models of allocation is to use non-labor income. Most of the work
in this area tends to reject the income pooling predicted by the unitary
model. For example, using data from Brazil, Thomas (1990) shows that
mothers and fathers income do not have equal e¤ects regarding nutrient
intake, fertility, child survival, and child weight for height. In similar on-
going work on Taiwan, Thomas and a co-author also reject the unitary
model based on consumption patterns. Early tests for Pareto e¢ ciency,
however, do not reject the hypothesis that intrahousehold allocations
are e¢ cient. Another rejection of the unitary model based on expendi-
tures in Cote dIvoire can be found in Hoddinott and Haddad (1995).
Lundberg, et. al. (1995) use a natural experiment the shift of child
benet payments from father to mother to examine the income pooling
hypothesis in the United Kingdom. They reject the unitary model as
evidence shows that the shift in recipient led to greater expenditure on
womens and childrens goods. Using consumption data, a number of
papers have found grounds to reject the unitary model. Browning and
Chiappori (1994) test household demands for symmetry in the Slutsky
matrix. They nd that this condition does not hold for two member
households but does hold, as it should, for single member households.
Browning, et. al. (1994) also reject the unitary model of the household
with evidence that intrahousehold allocation is a¤ected by relative ages,
incomes, and the total expenditure of the household.
When the examination of intrahousehold models turns to produc-
tion, it is easier to examine Pareto e¢ ciency. Pareto e¢ cient production
implies that there would be no gains from redistributing household re-
sources say, from mens elds to womens elds. Using data from Burk-
ina Faso, and controlling for possible reallocations due to risk as well
as measurement error, Udry (1996) and Alderman, et. al. (1995) nd
that allocations are not Pareto e¢ cient and that the value of household
output could be increased some 10 to 20 percent by reallocating exist-
ing inputs. This result provides for a rejection of not only the unitary
model, but many of the collective models. More recent work has sought
to test the e¢ ciency of households by focusing on how risk is allocated.
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) use data from Ethiopia to estimate the ef-
fects of health shocks on nutritional status. They reject full insurance
at the household level. Doss (1998) uses rainfall data from Ghana to es-
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timate transitory income and shows that these shocks a¤ect household
expenditures di¤erentially based on who within the household sustains
the shock.
The notion of a unitary household has long been questioned outside
of economics. Papers such as Guyer and Peters (1987) indicate a number
of ways in which to challenge the unitary model. Studying the particular
case of rice farming in the Gambia, Carney and Watts (1990) provide
a case study of the dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining and power.
Much of the literature on West Africa indicates that men and women
keep separate accounts and even operate in separate economies (see Hill
(1975) for an overview). Zwarteveens work in Burkina Faso (1996)
documents separate asset streams and income areas for men and women.
Karanja-Diejomaoh (1978) provides extensive detail on couples in Lagos,
Nigeria and shows that they maintain separate bank accounts about
which the spouse is almost always unaware, have incomes (often in the
formal sector) that the spouse cannot estimate, and that males have
little idea about the extent of their wives contribution to household
expenditures. The reasons for this often mutual ignorance seems to be
to protect their own income from the demands of the spouse. Oppong
(1971) indicates that the separation of economic activities and ignorance
of each others income is also a characteristic of households in Accra.
She (in this and subsequent work) argues that: ...the nancial aspect
of the conjugal relationship exhibited two characteristics, jointness as
regards husbandsand wivesnancial provision for their households and
segregation with regard to spousesnancial management and ownership
of property(184).
With whom then do men and women share information and economic
activities with? The kin, especially the clan or lineage, is the oft-cited
example. Indeed, this serves as the basis for Grimards (1997) work
and this explanation is cited by a number of non-economists who have
worked directly on Ghana (see for example, Fortes (1950) and Feldman
and Feldman (1978)). However, others such as Addai-Sundiata (1996)
cite economic change as an important factor in the breakdown of some
important aspects of the traditional kinship network. Economists who
have considered transfers as insurance in the context of the dynamics of
agricultural change also warn that we might see results like this. Rosen-
zweig (1988) in his work on India argues that technical change may
change the distribution of risks. This would drive a wedge between fam-
ily members who are farming di¤erent crops, while allowing for more
robust contracting between members of the same farming (or income
generating activity) cohort. In our area, the recent surge in pineap-
ple production, with its vastly di¤erent production technology, could be
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generating this type of e¤ect.
Organizations consisting of (not necessarily related) members of the
same gender may provide the needed alternative to the clan in these
times of economic change (see Wipper (1984) for a discussion of womens
voluntary groups in Sub-Saharan Africa). Aryeeteys (1995) work on
seed technology di¤usion in the Ada area of Ghana provides a case where
men transmit information mainly to each other and seem to have a
separate and distinct network from women. In the area this paper studies
there are a number of gender based organizations around production
(for example a male farmers cooperative). Many of the women (but
few of the men) generate o¤-farm income through marketing activities
and the market provides an important social and economic locus for
the women. These joint activities can spawn insurance networks. One
example is an organization called the Womens Committee. Consisting
of 120 members, one of its chief functions was to provide assistance to
a member if a relative passed away (note that a funeral is a signicant
expense in Ghanian culture). In the end, though, such organizations are
only indicative. Recall Hills words (above), a woman is more likely to
spend more of her time and activities with fellow women than her spouse
or other men and the same is true for her husband, and so structured
organizations may be unnecessary.
This section has discussed how a critical component in individual
welfare might be measured and examined. Informal insurance provides
a critical bu¤er for poor households in the risky agricultural environ-
ment of developing countries. What this paper will do is look behind
the household door to see how individuals cope with risk. Households
in West Africa are divided into male and female spheres and in order
to better understand the welfare of their members it is necessary to un-
derstand to what degree they share risk. When I nd that they do not
share it with each other, I turn to the connections individuals may have
outside of the household.
3 The Model
This section provides a discussion of the model of how e¢ cient risk shar-
ing would take place at the individual level, both within the household
and as part of a larger group (e.g. individuals within a village) that
builds most directly on the work of Townsend (1994). After identifying
what behavior we might expect in consumption patterns, I turn to the
most likely mechanism to achieve this, transfers.
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3.0.1 The individual in the household
We have two individuals, i and j, living in the same household. There
are S possible states of the world that occur with probability s. Over
time, with a discount rate of , we can write the individuals expected
utility from consuming a vector of goods, cist, as:
TX
t=1
t
SX
s=1
sU(cist) (1)
Let hi be the programming weight assigned to individual i in household
h. If we denote the other member of the household as j, then a Pareto
e¢ cient allocation of risk within the household can be characterized by:
max
chistchjst
hi(
TX
t=1
t
SX
s=1
sU(chist)) + (1  hi)(
TX
t=1
t
SX
s=1
sU(chjst)) (2)
subject to the following constraint:
yhist + yhjst = chist + chjst 8s; t (3)
This program yields the rst order condition:
hiU
0(chist) = (1  hi)U 0(chjst) 8s; t (4)
If we assume that each consumer has the following exponential utility
function:
U(chist) =   1

e chist (5)
Then the optimal consumption of both husband and wife at a given time
is:
chist = chjst   1

ln(
1  hi
 hi
) 8s (6)
Thus consumption in the household should move directly together. We
can represent their income at a given point in time as the sum of an
average component and a shock, x, which is i.i.d. and has a mean of
zero:
yhist = yhi + xhist (7)
Equation (6) indicates that the value of this shock should not matter
to the consumption of person i in state s. In order to test for perfect
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insurance, we can add this as an exclusion restriction to equation (6)
which can now be written as:
chist = chjst + (yhis + xhist) + 
1

ln(
1  hi
 hi
) (8)
Taking the di¤erence of consumption over time, we have:
chist   chist 1 = (chjst   chjst 1) + (xhist   xhist 1) + " (9)
where " is i.i.d measurement error. Given our theoretical results, the
coe¢ cient on the idiosyncratic shocks, , should be zero if the individual
has perfect insurance.
3.0.2 The individual within a group
Suppose that individuals instead pool risk with some group that may or
may not include their spouse. For now, let all is belong to group 1,
and the js to group 2 (the result is specic to the group whether or not
it includes both i and j). The problem is now:
max
chist
HX
h=1
hi(
TX
t=0
t
SX
s=1
sU(chist) for i = 1; 2 (10)
subject to:
HX
h=1
yhist =
HX
h=1
chist (11)
and
0 < hi < 1;
HX
h=1
hi = 1 (12)
Using the exponential utility function, the optimal consumption for in-
dividual i is:
chist =
1
H
HX
h=1
chjst +
1

(lnhi  
HX
h=1
lnhj) (13)
As before, we can add the restriction of income, and take the di¤erence
over time to arrive at:
chist   chist 1 = (cst   cst 1) + (xist   xist 1) + " (14)
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where cst is the average consumption for each separate group. The exten-
sion to a variety of groups is straightforward. The results indicate that
consumption should be una¤ected by idiosyncratic shocks and vary with
average clan consumption. In theory, we can use this regression (the
individual analog of Townsends household level result) to test insurance
within a variety of groups. In practice, as I will discuss in the empirical
section, we cannot estimate this equation as it stands, but have to use
a variation of it.
3.1 Coping Mechanisms
The most likely mechanism for coping with risks across states at a given
time is transfers1. Transfers, whether in cash or kind, provide an ideal
contemporaneous insurance mechanism as they allow for individuals to
adjust their consumption in the period of the shock and avoid variation
of consumption over time.
3.1.1 Transfers within the household
In order to incorporate transfers into the model, we can rewrite (7) as:
yhist = yhi + xhist + hist (15)
where  is is person is net transfer to his or her spouse in state s. Solving
the optimization problem as before, the optimal level of transfers within
the household is
hist =
1
2
(yhjst   yhist) + 1
2
 ln(
hi
1  hi ) 8s; t (16)
where y includes both the transitory (x) and permanent parts of income.
We can see then that transfers should compensate directly for any idio-
syncratic shocks to income (in this case at 1
2
of the shock). Taking the
di¤erence of this equation over time gives the equation to be estimated:
hist   hist 1 = 1
2
(xhjst   xhjst 1)  1
2
(xhist   xhist 1) 8 s (17)
3.1.2 Transfers within the community
We can now rewrite (7) as:
1Udry (1990, 1994) indicates that credit may provide a valuable contemporaneous
insurance mechanism in theWest African village setting. Future versions of this paper
will examine this.
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yhist = yhi + xhist + !hist + hist (18)
Where ! represents transfers from persons outside of the household.
Adding up across households and solving for the optimal level of transfers
we have:
IH (hist+!hist+yhi+xhist) =
HX
l=1
IX
j=1
 jlst+!jlst+yjl+xjlst+Kjk (19)
where K is again the di¤erence in programming weights. We can rewrite
this as:
(hist+!hist) =
1
IH
(
HX
l=1
IX
j=1
 jlst+!jlst+yjl+xjlst+Kjk) yhi xhist (20)
which indicates that the transfers that one receives are a function of the
di¤erence of the individual shock from the average.
Taking the di¤erence over time we have:
(!hist !hist 1)+ (hist  hist 1) = (xhist xhist 1)+(xst  xst 1)+ "
(21)
where xst is the group mean. This is the equation to be estimated.
4 The Data
In order to estimate the changes in consumption and transfers as a result
of shocks, we need data on these over time. All the data used in this
paper comes from a two year rural household survey in southern Ghana
supervised by Christopher Udry and myself. Before discussing the data
that I will use in estimation, it is worth discussing the study area and
the broader design of the survey.
The survey was carried out from November 1996 to October 1998
in the Aukapim South District of the Eastern Region of Ghana. This
area is a dynamic agricultural region. In addition to the staple maize
and cassava crops that make up the bulk of agricultural production,
many farmers have started to grow pineapple for export and domestic
processing. The staple crop agricultural system is based on two seasons,
a major season, stretching from March to July, and a minor season from
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September to December. Pineapple does not need to adhere to this
growing season, and hence it shows a less pronounced seasonal variation.
Within this area, we identied four village clusters with a variety of
market conditions and cropping patterns. Within each village, we ran-
domly selected 60 married couples (or triples) to be interviewed (in those
villages where there was more than 60 resident couples). Enumerators
then interviewed the male and female respondents separately. Each per-
son was interviewed 15 times during the course of 2 years. A list of the
rounds, their dates, and the questionnaires administered is available at
www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2//ghanadata.html.
4.1 Consumption
In order to estimate consumption, I use data from 3 expenditure ques-
tionnaires administered thrice during the two years of survey work.
These questionnaires covered food consumed from own farms, purchased
food, and other (family) expenses. This provides expenditure informa-
tion but not assigned consumption. However, a number of goods are
clearly assignable in that their consumption is private. These are al-
coholic beverages, non-alcoholic pre-packaged beverages, prepared food
(from kiosks), personal care products, hair cuts, public transport, petrol,
car repairs, books, newspapers, entertainment, lottery tickets, and kola
nuts. Table 1 presents summary statistics on total expenditure on these
goods, by round. These data do not include village 1 because I dis-
covered that the enumerator conducting the interviews for round 4 and
round 8 consistently under-covered certain expenditure categories.
Table 2a provides total monthly household expenditure. This in-
cludes all expenditures as well as food harvested from the household
farms2. Given an average household size of 5.6 and an exchange rate of
approximately 2100 cedis to one dollar, annual expenditure per capita
is around $600. Table 2b contains estimates of total household food ex-
penditure (again including own harvests). Food expenditure accounts
for about 65 percent of total expenditure.
In an e¤ort to capture information ows within the household, we
asked both spouses to provide not only their own expenditure but also
estimates of their spousesexpenditure. The male enumerators initially
encountered problems implementing this, so coverage is not complete.
Nonetheless, we have at least two (own and female) and sometimes three
estimates of each expenditure. Thus, Tables 2a and 2b also provide esti-
2This includes harvest and expenditure from household members other than the
husband and wife  which is quite small.
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mates of total and food expenditure constructed using only the womens
reports. Note that the female reports are much lower, which seems to
be because they were reporting only the expenditure they knew about.
This may be indicative of the level of private information within the
household3.
4.2 Shocks
I have two di¤erent measures of shocks. First, there are illnesses. We
asked respondents to recall major illnesses4 and the cost of any related
treatments. We asked for this information at two points: rst in March
1998 (round 11) and then again in August-September 1998 (round 15).
The second measure of shocks is unexpected agricultural shocks. These
include pests, plant diseases, theft, and other events. We asked the
respondents about these at three di¤erent times during the survey; two
of these corresponded with the questions on illness, the third was in July
1997 (round 6). Thus, I construct the two periods of shocks to roughly
correspond to the administration of the expenditure questionnaires. I
use illness in the period spanned by rounds 1 to 4 and rounds 8 to 12. I
use agricultural shocks in the period from round 1 to 65 and from round
8 to 12.
In rounds 11 and 15, we asked respondents to describe the shock, its
severity (ranked from 1 to 5), the proportion of the plot a¤ected and
the estimated value of the damage. The value of the damage provides
the needed monetary measure of a shock to compare to the change in
consumption. Unfortunately, we did not ask for the value of the shock
in the period up to round 6. Thus, in terms of the model, I have the
value of xit but not the value of xit 1. However, I can use the data from
the later rounds to estimate the value of the shocks. In order to do
this, I posit that the value of the damage is a function of the severity of
the shock, the village where it occurred, the primary crop on the eld,
the toposequence of the eld a¤ected, and the soil type. I estimate this
value damage function using the plots which reported a shock in either
the round 11or round 15 questionnaires. The results of this estimation
are in Table 3. Using these results, I can create an estimated value of
3We can rule out the hypothesis that the higher own report totals are caused
by double counting as men and women report signicantly di¤erent structures to
expenditure.
4We dened major illnesses as those that resulted in medical expenses and/or
resulted in missed work.
5This leads to the inclusion of shocks beyond the consumption period, which may
create noise and lower the reliability of the results.
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the shock for xit 1. Using the coe¢ cients provided by the rst stage
estimation, we have the estimated value of damage due to agricultural
shocks to round 6. This, as well as reported values for the other shocks is
in table 46. As we can see from the statistics, mean shocks can represent
a signicant proportion of the mean household expenditure. Moreover,
if we add one standard deviation to the mean, shocks can represent in
excess of one months total household expenditure in the rst six rounds,
and approximately 80 percent of expenditure in the round 8 to 12 period.
The estimation of the early shocks leads to the problem that xit 1
is now measured with error. I can treat this as a problem of errors in
variables and calculate the reliability ratio from the rst stage to adjust
the standard errors in the second stage. However, since the regressions
I estimate use a di¤erenced regressor, the standard reliability ratio does
not apply. Appendix 1 explains how I derive the reliability ratios for
these di¤erenced regressors for use in multivariate regressions.
4.3 Transfers
We collected an extensive panel of data on spouse to spouse transfers.
The major transfer between husband and wife is chop money. This
is almost always a male to female transfer that is meant for household
food and expenses. The amount is usually determined by the husband,
although some of them did indicate that they consulted their wives.
Another (more indirect) source of transfers is when the respondent sells
produce from their spouses farm. We collected this data from the re-
spondents over the course of 7 rounds, spaced about six weeks apart.
Table 5 shows the mean value of these transfers by round. As we can
see, chop money accounts for approximately one tenth of monthly house-
hold expenditure. Note though, that as with expenditures, we received
di¤erent accounts of the amount depending on whom we asked. Men
indicated the amount was higher.
Unfortunately, we did not collect data on inter-household transfers
as frequently. We can use the gifts and transfer questionnaire from
rounds 5 and 11 to compare with our shock panel. Recall that our
shock data extends from round 1 to 6 and from 8 to 12. This will yield
four rounds of shock data preceding each measure of transfers (with
two additional rounds in the rst period). The gifts data allows us
to distinguish between family and non-family transfers but the earlier
6While the round 1 to 6 and 8 to 12 shocks seem to have vastly di¤erent values, a
large part of the di¤erences seems to be driven by di¤erent levels of incidence. There
was a much higher number of overall shocks reported in round 6 (289 to 171), and
much a higher proportion of these were reported by men.
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gifts data does not have a complete listing of the gender of the giver.
Table 6 shows the mean values of the transfers for the week preceding
the interview. Relative to the monthly spouse to spouse transfers these
are small. However, they do have a large range as the maximum and
minimum values indicate. [see 2252 conshok2.do to do this]
In addition to direct transfers of cash, we can look at transfers in
kind. Within the household, one form of this would be for one household
member to increase their expenditure on goods that she and her spouse
share when her spouse has a shock. To this end, I examine expenditures
on children including school related expenses and clothing (I restrict this
examination only to goods that can be clearly assigned and hence exclude
food). Table 7 shows the summary statistics of spending by men and
women on childrens goods.
Finally, a common form of transfer in kind in these villages is labor
provided either by family or friends. Table 8 shows the breakdown
of labor by source and whether paid or unpaid on individuals plots
averaged over the entire two year period of the survey. As the table
shows, the cultivator is the major source of labor on these farms for both
men and women. Outside of this, men engage in a fair amount of labor
hiring, which is in line with the facts that they tend to cultivate larger
areas as well as grow the main cash crop in the area, pineapple. Non-
remunerated labor also plays an important role, accounting for around
25 percent of male, and 30 percent of female, total labor usage. Women
get most of their unpaid labor from their family (72 percent of unpaid
labor) while men get it mostly from their spouse (42 percent of their
unpaid labor). In the sections that follow, we will examine whether or
not these labor patterns respond to the shocks the cultivator receives.
5 Estimation
This section examines the implications of the theory on both intra-
household and broader insurance using our data. I start with a direct
examination of consumption co-movement and insurance. This is fol-
lowed by a look at various forms of transfers as an insurance mechanism.
5.1 Intrahousehold consumption
In order to examine insurance within the household, we can estimate
equation 9. Table 9 presents the results. These results indicate that
agricultural shocks have virtually no impact on private consumption.
The estimated coe¢ cient is positive, but insignicant, and the 95 per-
cent condence interval indicates that at most, consumption falls by 3
percent of the agricultural shock. The illness shock (proxied here by
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illness cost) is also close to zero, but less precisely estimated. At most
consumption falls by 47 percent of the illness shock cost. Hence, from
the impacts of shocks on consumption, individuals look as if they are
well insured against income shocks. However, these results also indi-
cate that the locus of insurance is not the household. The coe¢ cient
on spouses consumption, which the theory predicts to be equal to 1, is
negative and not signicant. The 95 condence interval does not en-
compass one. The nal line of table 9 reports the F-test of coe¢ cients
predicted by equation 9, and based on this we can reject full insurance
within the household, despite the fact the individuals experience little
change in their private consumption as a result of their shocks. This
leads to the conclusion that the household is the wrong unit of analysis
for risk pooling. Despite the fact that husbands and wives farm separate
plots and engage in separate economic activities and thus could provide
very e¢ cient risk diversication, they do not insure each other. This
conclusion may well reach beyond risk. Given the absence of a Pareto
e¢ cient pooling of risk within the household, there may be ine¢ cien-
cies in other areas of household consumption and production. Despite
the fact that households do not share risk in a pareto e¢ cient manner,
individual consumption seems fairly well insured to shocks, suggesting
that while households may be ine¢ cient sharers of risk, individuals may
satisfy this elsewhere. Before turning to an examination of what the
risk sharing group might be, however, we need to examine how robust
these results are.
One possible explanation for these results is that either consumption
or shocks are measured with error. I turn rst to shocks. In addition
to our shock data, we have separately gathered information on income.
This is collected through a combination of farm output questionnaires
(collected in each of the 14 rounds, with both starting and terminal
standing crops valued by the farmer) and a non-farm income question-
naire (administered thrice). Using these data, we can check to see if our
measures of shocks really do matter, at least in terms of income. Panel
A of table 10 shows the results for the change in total income regressed
against the change in both illness and agricultural shocks. Agricultural
shocks have a negative and signicant coe¢ cient of 0.53, indicating that
a little more than half of the value of the shock is reected in an income
change. This gives some independant verication that shocks matter in
ways that suggest they are not pure measurement error. Illness shocks,
measured here by the value of health related expenses, have no signif-
icant impact on income. When we disaggregate these results by plot
and o¤-farm income (panels B and C respectively) we see that this re-
sult seems to come from plot income, which further substantiates the
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conclusion that these shocks matter to income in ways that we would
expect.
Turning to the other side of the story, we also must ask if our con-
sumption data are measured with error. The model predicts that the
coe¢ cient on spouses consumption should be one. The results indicate
that this coe¢ cient appears to be signicantly di¤erent from one at the
95 percent level. In order to take a closer look at the comovement of
own consumption with ones spouse, table 11 shows a panel regression
of own consumption against ones spouse. The coe¢ cient here conrms
our earlier results, the coe¢ cient is negative and signicant at the 5 per-
cent level, indicating no comovement of own and spouse consumption.
Nonetheless, this result could be caused by measurement error. Sup-
pose that consumption was reported with error so that the consumption
observed here is true consumption plus some error, u:
c = c +u; u  N(0; 2u) (22)
As a result of this error, the estimate of  (the coe¢ cient on con-
sumption) will be biased towards zero when there are no covariates as
follows (Judge, et. al. 1988):
plim^ =
2c
2c + 2u
(23)
We also know that:
2c = 
2
c + 
2
u (24)
where c2 is the variance of the observed consumption. In order to es-
timate the extent of the measurement error needed to obtain the result
in table 11, we can solve equation 23 using our estimate of  from the
regression results and the fact that the model predicts that  should be
1. Substituting these values in for ^ and , respectively, I can solve for
2u:
2u = 1:09
2
c (25)
which is impossible. Thus, I rule out the hypothesis that these results are
due to measurement error. So if husbands and wives are not sharing risk
with one and another, then with whom are they pooling? The following
section examines alternate congurations of the risk pool.
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5.2 Group Consumption
In order to ascertain the correct group outside of the household that in-
dividuals insure with, we would like to estimate equation 14. However,
as Deaton (1990) argues, the presence of the mean of the dependant
variable as an independent variable is likely to yield uninformative re-
sults (he also shows how this holds for the left-out mean). What Deaton
shows is that the average values of the s in equation 14 are mechani-
cally dened to be 1, and hence this estimation strategy is likely not to
produce useful information.
Instead, Deaton advocates the use of the following equation (adapted
for my notation):
cig =
GX
j=1
jig + xig + " (26)
where gi denotes an individual i who is a member of group g, and
 is a dummy corresponding to group g. As before, we would expect
 to be zero if individuals are completely insured. If there are village
level changes in income, we would expect  to be signicant, and assist
us in the identication of the appropriate risk sharing group. When I
estimate equation 26 I obtain the results that, as in the household level
estimates,  is close to zero. However, the village (or any other a priori
relevant group) dummies are not signicant, which ts with our casual
observation that these villages experienced no aggregate shocks during
the two years in which we worked with them. In sum, we cannot identify
the appropriate risk sharing group, other than observing that it is not
the household from these consumption data. However, I will endeavor
to identify some potential risk-sharing groups from the transfer data, to
which I now turn.
5.3 Transfers within the household
Transfers between spouses are much more frequent and, on average,
much larger than any other transfers individuals in these villages re-
ceive. Thus, these might provide a likely vehicle for insurance. However,
as shown earlier, there seems to be no insurance at the intra-household
level. I examine this question using an estimation of equation 17, includ-
ing lagged shocks and round dummies. As these data exhibit signicant
autocorrelation, I estimate this regression using GLS with correction for
an AR(2) process and report semi-robust standard errors clustered on
the individual. The data I use includes round by round spouse to spouse
transfers (reported separately by the husband and wife) as well as the
agricultural shocks reported by each respondent for each round. For
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this panel of agricultural shocks, values were provided directly by the
respondent, so there is no need to use the errors-in-variables correction.
Table 12A provides the results of estimating equation 17 using the
male reports of di¤erent transfers and the respondentsown reports of
the value of agricultural shocks. The rst panel shows the results using
the change in net chop money received as the dependent variable. The
results indicate that all of the coe¢ cients are not signicantly di¤erent
from zero, and the condence intervals show that these are fairly tightly
estimated. As discussed earlier, in addition to the direct cash transfers,
spouses sometimes take goods from each others farms. This form of
transfer shows some responsiveness to shocks, with the womans shock in
the previous period resulting in an increase (signicant at the 10 percent
level) in the net chop money that the man receives. However, the sign
on this coe¢ cient is the opposite we would expect with insurance, as
her shock leads to an increase in the net transfer that he receives (and
indeed, this is what we might expect if there was less on his farms for
her to receive). The coe¢ cient on mens own shocks, lagged one period,
is closer to what we would expect if there was intrahousehold insurance,
but it is not signicant at the 10 percent level (although close).
Table 12B provides similar estimates using the womans report of
the transfers that take place between her and her husband. In the rst
panel, we see a signicant (at better than the 5 percent level) response of
the transfers she receives as a function of her shocks two periods before.
Again, this sign is the opposite of that predicted by intrahousehold insur-
ance, her net transfers decrease as the value of the shock increases. The
second panel shows the responsiveness of produce transfers to shocks.
Here, the impact of a shock on the mans farm is clear, both lagged
shocks are signicant and negative (at the 5 percent level). While this
is to be expected, as the shocks a¤ect his agricultural output, the signs
(combined with the lack of a compensatory cash transfer) conrm the
absence of intrahousehold insurance. In sum, these transfer results con-
rm our consumption results, indicating that there is no intrahousehold
risk sharing taking place through these types of transfers.
Another form of transfer that may be taking place is through common
household expenditures. Husbands and wives may be reducing their
contribution to household public goods in response to their own shocks,
with the expectation that their spouse will increase their contribution
in a form of insurance. Table 13 reports estimates for a variation of
equation 17 where transfers are represented by spending on childrens
goods. The change in own agricultural shocks are signicant (at the 10
percent level) and positive, i.e. as the shocks increase, so does spending
on children, which is the opposite prediction of intrahousehold insurance.
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Spouse shocks are not signicant. While these results are heartening
in that they show that children do not seem to be negatively impacted
by parents shocks, it also shows that intrahousehold insurance does not
take place in one of the central forms of pooled consumption.
5.4 Transfers from outside of the household
Spouses are not insuring with one another, yet they appear to be insuring
with someone. This section examines potential broad groups in the con-
text of cash and kind transfers from individuals outside of the household.
We rst turn to cash and consumption good (e.g. foodstu¤) transfers
from di¤erent groups. In order to do this, we estimate equation 21 for a
variety of groups. Since our data does not permit us to identify individ-
ual family and friend connections in the shock data, we use the village
average shock as the group average consumption. Table 14 presents the
results of equation 21 estimated separately for men and women. Panel
A presents the results for the change in total non-spouse transfers. For
men, transfers respond positively and signicantly (at better than the
5 percent level) to own agricultural shocks, indicating that men receive
higher transfers in response to their shocks. Transfers to women, on
the other hand, show no signicant response to agricultural or illness
shocks. In an e¤ort to identify the group that provides support, we are
able to disaggregate transfers into those received from the family and
those received from non-family. Results for these two groups can be
found in panels B and C. These show that the support for men comes
from non-family friends, a surprising result given the attention in the
literature to family support networks in Africa. While the coe¢ cient
on non-family transfers is small, it is important to keep in mind that
data restrictions limit us to using transfers from the past week. Shocks
on the other hand, span a 4 to 6 round period (approximately 24 to 36
weeks). Hence, if we aggregate up this response, it would seem that
men receive signicant support from non-family members when faced
with an agricultural shock.
Another form that transfers can take is through labor. As table 8
indicated, a substantial portion of the labor individuals use on their plots
is free labor. One form of insurance may be an increase in the amount
of labor that is unpaid either in absolute terms or relative to paid labor.
Hence, we can estimate an equation similar to 21 for individual labor.
The equation I estimate is:
Llit = 1xigt + 2xgt + 3
X
j 6=l
Ljit + " (27)
where Llit is labor of type l used by individual i in round t, xigt is the
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shock received by individual i in round t, xgt is the relevant mean group
shock (either village or spouse) in round t, and
P
j 6=l Ljit is the sum of
all other labor types at time t used by individual i on all of her plots,
introduced as a control for overall farming activity. The estimation
includes round dummies to control for seasonality and other time e¤ects
and as well as village xed e¤ects to control for potentially di¤erent
labor markets across our four villages7. I also include individual and
group average shocks lagged 3 periods. The structure of the data allow
us to estimate this as a panel, we have data on labor for each round as
well as illness and agricultural shocks by date. Using our agricultural
data, we have shock data spanning rounds 8 to 15, while the illness data
stretches back to round 2.
Table 15 provides the results for GLS estimates of equation 27, cor-
rected for an ar(3) process. In the interests of brevity, I report only
the coe¢ cients on own and group average shocks for each type of labor.
Note that spouse labor has to estimated somewhat di¤erently, as I use
the spouses shocks rather than the group average. This leads to smaller
observations for these regressions.
Table 15A shows the results for an illness shock (represented by a
dummy). In the rst panel we can see that the only signicant and
positive response for men (at the 10 percent level) is a lagged response
from family labor. The size of this coe¢ cient is large, amounting to
well over half of the average family labor that men use in the average
round (see table 8). Men seem to decrease their use of paid labor in
response to a shock 1 period in the past, while they face a cutback in
labor from their spouse in the period that they receive an illness shock.
These are also fairly large, around one-third of the average labor use of
each type in the average round. For women, the signicant response
comes from non-family labor in the same period that the illness occurs.
The coe¢ cient here is close to double the average use of 1 hour of this
type of labor by women in a given round. Thus, while non-family non-
compensated labor does not seem to play an important role in womens
production overall, it seems to play a more important role when a woman
is faced by a shock.
Table 15B shows the estimates for an agricultural shock (measured
in thousands of cedis). The results for men show a signicant and
positive response of paid labor in the same period that they have a
shock, but the shocks of one period before have a negative and signicant
coe¢ cient. This may suggest that men initially use paid labor to cope
with a agricultural shock but then return their paid labor to more of a
7Our estimation here does include village one, since it is only the private con-
sumption data that are not usable.
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steady state level when the initial damage has been controlled8. Thus,
a one standard deviation in the value of a shock (the by-round standard
deviation for men is 65,119 cedis) would result in an increase in a 10.4
hour increase in paid labor for shocks in the same period, and a decline of
4.6 hours for shocks one period earlier. The labor that men receive from
their spouse is negative and signicant in response to an agricultural
shock 2 rounds ago. Women respond to agricultural shocks by increasing
(in the same round as the shock) their dominant source of labor, their
own. Thus, a one standard deviation (22,005 cedis) for women would
result in an increase of their own labor of 5.9 hours. Women who
experience a shock also face a decline in family labor (from a shock 2
periods ago) and in labor received from their spouse (in the same period
as the shock). The decline in spouse labor in response to a one standard
deviation increase in the value of the shock would result in about a 1.5
hour decline in spouse labor and a 1.3 hour decline in family labor.
These results show a variety of insurance arrangements through labor
markets in these villages. Men and women seem to insure di¤erently
from each other as well as in di¤erent ways for di¤erent types of shocks.
Faced with an illness, men seem to get help from their family. Men re-
ceive no insurance through labor in the face of an agricultural shock, in-
stead they seem to cope through an increased use of paid labor. Women,
on the other hand, receive a signicant increase in non-remunerated la-
bor from non-family members when faced with an illness. They also
tend to cope with agricultural shocks on their own, although they resort
to own labor rather than hired labor. All of these results also conrm
our earlier results on spouse to spouse insurance, in no instance is there
a signicant increase in spouse labor in response to a shock9.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides some insights into how individuals cope with risk in
an informal-insurance system. The household, despite apparent advan-
tages for information and enforcement, is not the locus of any insurance.
These results indicate that the private consumption of wife and hus-
band do not move together, although this consumption is not a¤ected
by shocks. Data on the main intrahousehold transfer, chop money, as
well as transfers in kind (produce and labor) show no responsiveness to
8Some of the shocks received by these indivduals are partially reversible, but for
the most part labor may be increased to contain the damage (e.g. pest/disease
spreading).
9Here the controls for spouse shocks are instructive for both men and women in
the agricultural shock regressions, the spouse reduces labor supply in response to a
shock on her/his own plot, not that of the cultivator.
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shocks in ways that would be indicative of risk pooling. We can also
rule out that such risk pooling takes place through shifting expenditure
burdens for children.
Instead of insuring within the household, individuals are pooling risk
with groups outside of the household. These groups vary with not
only the gender of the person receiving the shock, but also the source of
the risk they face. Men receive signicant assistance from non-family
friends in the form of cash or (non-labor) kind transfers when they face
an agricultural shock. Both men and women receive additional non-
remunerated labor when they face an illness. For women, the support
comes from non-family friends, while men receive additional labor from
family members.
These results indicate that we need to look within and beyond, but
not at, the household when we seek to understand informal insurance
or make policy. Husbands and wives in this part of Ghana do not
share risk with one another, rather they choose a variety of risk pooling
groups based on the type of shock they face. While these results show
that these groups are di¤erent by gender, further work needs to be done
to understand what underlies individuals di¤erent choices of risk pooling
groups and mechanisms.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that informal insur-
ance arrangements are best viewed at the individual level but also that
these insurance arrangements are more complex than the literature to
date has shown. While individuals seem to protect their consumption
well against income shocks from agriculture and illness, the result that
men and women insure di¤erently for di¤erent shocks indicates that we
need to undertake further work to understand this so that we can make
appropriately targeted policy, and avoid policy where none is needed.
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Appendix 1: Constructing a reliability ratio for the di¤erence
measure of shocks
For the purpose of this discussion, let me disaggregate the shock
vector (X) into agricultural shocks (S) and illness shocks (L). Recall
that the value of agricultural shocks is reported in period t (St) and is
estimated in period t-1 (St 1). In a non-di¤erenced, univariate case, we
could construct the reliability ratio from the r-squared of the regression
of the estimated damage on the reported damage in period t.
However, I use the following variable for estimation:
St = St   St 1 (28)
Where shocks at t are measured without additional error and shocks
at time t-1 are measured with an additional, estimable error component
(vt 1) so, given that S  St 1:
St 1 = St 1 + vt 1 (29)
Thus St is:
St = S

t   St 1   vt 1 (30)
and the variance is:
2x = 
2
St + 
2
St 1   2cov(St ; St 1) + 2v (31)
assuming that the variance in true reported shocks is constant over
time, the true variance of X is:
2X = 
2(St   St 1) = 22S   2cov(St ; St 1) (32)
Thus, the reliability ratio of St is:
RR St =
2X
2x
  (33)
Now,
let   cov(S

t ; S

t 1)
2S
(34)
So,
 =
2(1  )2S
2(1  )S2 + 2v
(35)
and
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 1 = 1 +
2v
2S2(1  )
(36)
Let us dene 0 as:
0  
2
S
2S + 
2
v
(37)
which we can also write as:
1  0 = 
2
v
2S + 
2
v
(38)
We can now rewrite (36)
 1 = 1 +
1  0
20(1  ) =
20   20+ 1  0
20(1  ) (39)
which reduces to:
^ =
2^0(1  ~)
1 + ^0   2^0~
(40)
We can estimate the various variables in (40) through univariate
regressions as follows:
St = ^S^t 1 (41)
and
St = ^0S^t (42)
We can then insert these into (40) and then control for the multi-
variate nature of the regression as follows:
1 =
^ R2
1 R2 (43)
Where R2 is the r-squared statistic from the following regression:
St   St 1 = (Lt   Lt 1) + (ct   ct 1) (44)
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